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I 
Abstract 
The liberalisation process and the (re)structuring of the electricity markets within Europe has been 
subject to extensive discussion during the last decade. A key concept in this discussion is the 
creation of multinational electricity markets. This thesis examines the process of multinational 
electricity market integration and price effects at the Nordic electricity market, Nord Pool. A 
theoretical model aiming to predict the effects of multinational electricity market integration is 
devised. The model defines the electricity spot price as the dependent variable and several market 
integration aspects as explanatory variables. The model is tested with an OLS-regression. The 
results presented indicate that multinational electricity market integration does have a significant 
effect on electricity prices at the Nordic power market, although not entirely as expected by the 
theoretical model. Increased flow of electricity across borders tends to decrease the spot price of 
electricity while the size of the electricity market in terms of increased volumes of trade tends to 
increase the spot price of electricity. Put differently, it seems as if increased volumes of trade do 
not per se benefit the customers in terms of lower electricity prices, rather the opposite. Instead, 
the results of this study points towards the importance of interconnectivity and transmission 
infrastructure. 
 
Key words: Electricity price, market integration, market liberalization, Nord Pool, statistical 
method, time series analysis. 
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Abbreviations and key concepts 
 
Transmission – The part of the electricity industry that transport electricity from 
production/import facilities to distributional networks and industrial consumers. 
 
Transmission networks – High voltage network connecting production and distributional 
networks. 
 
Distribution – The part of the electricity industry that delivers electricity to consumers. 
 
Distributional networks – The networks connecting domestic customers to transmission 
networks.  
 
Power exchange – Electricity market at which power is traded. 
 
Nord Pool Spot market – Nordic market for power trading. Divided into a day-ahead market 
(Elspot) and an intraday market (Elbas). 
 
Elspot market – Nord Pool Spot’s physical day-ahead market. 
 
Elspot system price – Electricity price determined at the Elspot market by the intersection of the 
aggregated supply and demand curves representing all bids and offers for the Nordic region. 
 
Traded volumes – The amount of electricity transacted every week at the Elspot market. 
 
Market participant – A person or a legal entity who has signed Nord Pool Spot’s Participant 
Agreement. 
 
Electricity generation – The process of generating electric power from other sources of primary 
energy. 
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1. Introduction 
For most of its history, national electricity markets in the EU have been protected from foreign 
competition, tightly regulated and dominated by large, vertically integrated power companies. 
Over the last 15 to 20 years, however, this situation has changed and the electricity markets 
around Europe has experienced a rapid restructuring. Two of the most noticeable trends are the 
liberalization of electricity markets and the focus on multinational integration of different 
geographical electricity markets. The European electricity market liberalisation has been 
described as the world’s most extensive cross-jurisdiction reform of the electricity sector (Pollitt 
and Jamasb, 2005:11). In addition to this, it is stated in the EU Electricity Market Directives 
(2003/54/EC and 2009/72/EC) that the EU has a clear intention of creating a single European 
market for electricity. 
 
In Scandinavia, the process of electricity market deregulation, liberalisation and multinational 
integration started long before the EU announced its intentions to create a single European market 
for electricity. Norway was the first Nordic country to launch the liberalisation process of its 
electricity market, closely followed by Sweden and Finland in the middle of the 1990s and by 
Denmark in 1998. During the 1990s, far-reaching reforms were implemented in the Nordic 
countries and markets opened up to increase competition in both generation and supply. In 
addition to this, the national markets opened up for cross border trade and most notably, the first 
multinational power exchange was created. By the turn of the century, the four national markets 
had transformed into a (close to) fully integrated electricity market and over the years, the Nordic 
power exchange has grown both in terms of participants and amount of total trade of electricity 
going through the power exchange (Lundgren et al., 2008:1). 
 
Following this rapid progress, the Nordic market is often described as one of the most developed 
electricity markets within Europe. Together with UK (which also started an electricity reform 
process in 1990) the Nordic countries are considered forerunners and ahead of time in relation to 
the Electricity Market Directives and the liberalisation process in the EU (Amundsen and 
Bergman, 2007:3383). However, in contrast to UK and many other regions in EU, the Nordic 
market has the special feature of being integrated by several national electricity markets. The 
Nordic countries are more or less alone in having an established reorganised multinational 
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electricity market. On the other hand, just because market institutions are common it does not 
necessarily mean that the Nordic electricity market is an integrated market with efficient price 
mechanisms.  
 
This thesis reviews the process of multinational electricity market integration and in particular, the 
focus is upon the price effects at the Nordic electricity market, Nord Pool. An understanding of 
how the electricity price is affected by international market integration is of great importance, 
especially in the light of the commitment within Europe to create a single market for energy. 
Power exchanges are of particular interest since the creation of power markets can be seen as the 
ultimate step within the liberalisation process. A power exchange offers a competitive wholesale 
trading facility for electricity and the functioning of multinational power exchanges are therefore 
critical issues in the development of a successful European power market. An understanding of 
the effects of multinational electricity market integration could help both decision makers and 
market participants to build valid expectations about future electricity price dynamics. 
 
This is how the rest of the thesis is organized: In chapter two, general background information 
about the Nordic electricity market and price formation is presented. Chapter three reviews 
previous literature on the relationship between market structure and price and the benefits of 
multinational cooperation in electricity markets. This paves the way for chapter four where the 
aim of the study and research question is presented. Building on top of previous research, a 
theoretical model of electricity price formation is presented in chapter five, followed by a 
definition of the study’s hypothesis and econometric specification. In chapter six, the 
methodology of the thesis is presented and methodological problems are discussed. The chapter 
also accounts for the data used in this study. In chapter seven, the results of the study are 
presented in terms of descriptive statistics and regression results. Finally, chapter eight follows 
with a concluding discussion and suggestions for further research.  
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2. The Nordic electricity market 
As previously mentioned, the Nordic countries have during the last decade experienced a rapid 
restructuring of their power markets. Starting with Norway in 1991, the Nordic countries have 
gradually liberalised their national electricity markets and step by step, merged their wholesale 
markets into a common Nordic electricity market. With this development, a new price mechanism 
for electricity price has been established and the functioning of the market has changed 
substantially. 
2.1 Functioning of the Nordic electricity market 
Today, the Nordic electricity market is divided into one physical market, Nord Pool Spot, and one 
financial market, NASDAQ OMX Commodities. In the financial market actors can hedge the 
system price for electricity through different financial instruments and trading of futures, forwards 
and options. The physical market Nord Pool Spot, is divided into two sub-markets; the Elspot 
market and the Elbas market. In short, Elspot is a cross border day-ahead market where hourly 
power contracts are traded for physical delivery the following day. The Elbas market on the other 
hand, is a cross border intra-day market where power is traded up to one hour before delivery. The 
market serves as a supplement to the Elspot market and the purpose is to secure the necessary 
balance between supply and demand in the power market for Northern Europe. Incidents may 
occur between the closing of the Elspot market and delivery next day. For example a nuclear plant 
could stop operating in Sweden or strong winds could cause higher power generation than planned 
in Denmark. In these situations, buyers and sellers are able to restore balance on the power market 
by trading power at the intra-day market close to real time. However the vast majority of the 
volume handled by Nord Pool is traded on the day-ahead Elspot market. For most part, balance 
between supply and demand is secured here. (Lundgren et al., 2008; Hjalmarsson, 2000). 
Henceforth, the Elspot market will be referred to in this thesis as the Nord Pool Spot market. 
2.2 How electricity price is set 
Following the market deregulation and multinational integration, the price of electricity is set at 
the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool. This was combined with a new pricing principle for 
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electric power. Prior to the deregulation the national markets had been dominated by state owned 
utilities and different mechanisms for price setting. In Sweden for example, the pricing principle 
was dominated by average cost pricing. (Lundgren, 2012:3) In Norway, the electricity price was 
set in relation to the long run marginal cost of the previous year. Demand was not incorporated in 
the models and the market was generally characterized by compensations and subsidies, which 
gave limited incentives for utilities to be cost effective. After the deregulation, the pricing 
principle changed to marginal cost pricing. The purpose of marginal cost pricing in electricity 
markets is to differentiate consumption by time of use and geographical area so that costs can be 
transmitted to the consumers in a fair way. The basic idea behind the pricing principle is that price 
is set according to the cost of marginal production, i.e. the producer’s cost of producing one extra 
unit of power (MWh). Consumers will be charged with the highest (marginal cost) price for all 
their demand. However, if consumers find the price too high they will reduce their demand. The 
price on the Nord Pool Spot market is therefore determined both by the aggregated sales bids of 
the producers and by the aggregated purchase bids of the consumers. (Pikk and Viiding, 2013) 
The supply bidders (electricity power generators) bid in how much they are willing to sell and at 
what price. If the market is working as expected, the generators bids should be reflected by their 
marginal cost of production (different for different power plants). The demand on the other hand, 
is determined by the consumers and their bids of how much electricity they need at the moment. 
The equilibrium price reflects the quantity where supply and demand intersect. (Lundgren, 
2012:8) The market price, also known as the system price or the spot price of electricity, will be 
set at the marginal cost of the marginal bid.  
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Figure 2.1 The principle of price formation at the Nord Pool Spot market. 
Variable cost of energy production 
EUR/MWh 
 
Comment: The figure illustrates how price is determined at the Nord Pool Spot market. The Y-axis represent the 
variable cost in EUR/MWh. The X-axis represents the power quantity produced in MW.  
Source: Energy Market Inspectorate (2006:3) 
 
It is important to note that following the Nordic electricity market reform, a distinction was made 
between electricity as a good and the service of electricity distribution through the transmission 
network. Whereas power supply and retail were set out to competition, distribution was left as a 
monopoly due to its special characteristics as a natural monopoly. Put differently, this means that 
people are free to choose which electricity supplier to buy their electricity from, just as they can 
choose the brand of the car they drive. But just as they are unable to choose a road construction 
contractor, they are unable to choose which network company to deliver the electricity. There is 
only one electricity grid, just as there is only one road system and the service of electricity 
distribution is thus a matter of domestic decisions and regulations. Power supply on the other 
hand, is considered a good that can be traded internationally. 
 
In light of this, the electricity consumer’s total cost for electricity consists of three parts; electrical 
energy, transmissions costs and tax. The only part of the total cost that is not regulated by the 
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governments of the Nordic countries is the electrical energy. The price of electricity is determined 
through competition on the common market for electricity, Nord Pool spot, which will be the 
continued focus of this thesis.  
 
Finally, it is also important to underline that the spot price is calculated from a bidding process 
before any bottlenecks are discovered in the transmission network. This means that the spot price 
represents the electricity price for the entire region only under the assumption that no transmission 
constraint is binding. Whenever interconnector capacity constrains power flows, the Nord Pool 
market is divided into two or more “price areas”. According to Bask and Widerberg (2008:20), the 
bidding price from Nord Pool Spot is the price used in the entire region around half of the time. 
Although Amundsen, Bergman and Von der Fehr (2005:9) claim that these price differences were 
present for shorter periods only and the price difference between the spot price and the different 
area prices is often marginal.  
3. Previous research 
The aim of this section is to give an introduction to the subject of this thesis, namely, the 
relationship between multinational electricity market integration and electricity price levels. First, 
because the aim of the deregulation and integration of the Nordic electricity sector was to develop 
a competitive market, which would benefit the consumers in the Nordic countries, I review the 
literature on competitive market forms and the potential economic benefits of market integration. 
The purpose of these first subsections is to get a better idea of how the electricity price might be 
affected at a multinational market with increased competition. The final subsections are devoted 
to electricity price dynamics at the Nord Pool Spot and the relationship between multinational 
electricity market integration and electricity price levels. 
3.1 Natural monopolies 
Contemporary understanding of economy underlines the importance of competition in order to 
increase efficiency of production and lower the prices for consumers. To claim that competition is 
good for consumers and overall resource allocation is not too controversial. However, to establish 
competition is not as easy in every market. In some markets it may even be associated with great 
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difficulties. On a network-based market, such as the electricity market, it is neither practically nor 
theoretically optimal to allow several competing companies to build their own networks to deliver 
their goods to the consumers. In industries like the electric network industry there are increasing 
returns to scale in infrastructure; so large that duplication of the infrastructure is economically 
impossible or at least costly enough for infrastructural monopolies to be preferable. In economic 
theory, this is referred to as natural monopolies. 
 
Since the network industry for transmission and distribution of electricity is characterized by 
natural monopolies, generation and supply are often highlighted as the potentially competitive 
segments of the value chain of electricity. In order to foster efficiency in the entire value chain of 
electricity, Amundsen and Bergman (2002) argue that mainly two types of regulations are needed. 
On the one hand, there is a need for traditional regulation of natural monopoly prices, service 
quality and investments. On the other hand, there is a need for regulation aimed at securing 
competition in generation and supply. One way to approach this has been to introduce 
liberalisation measures such as deregulation and multinational integration of the electricity 
markets, measures that will continue to be the focus point for this thesis. 
3.2 Trade across borders and economic efficiency 
Multiple benefits can be gained from integrated power markets. For this study a number of 
distinctive benefits are introduced and the first one of them is the ability to exchange electricity 
across borders. Damsgaard and Green (2005) identify three theoretical aspects of multinational 
trade of electricity that help to illustrate why the creation of a common electricity market is 
expected to increase trade across borders and spur efficiency. The first aspect of multinational 
electricity trade is described as simple electricity trade. The authors conclude that if producers in 
Sweden offer less expensive electricity compared to producers in Norway, and if consumers are 
willing to pay this offered price, Sweden will export electricity to Norway. The second aspect of 
trade is related to transmission flows. If Denmark wants to export electricity to Finland, the 
majority of the electricity has to be transported through Sweden. Even though Denmark might 
have direct connection to Finland parts of the power will have to be transported via Swedish 
transmission lines, hence existing infrastructure will be utilized even more and incentives for 
investments will increase. The third aspect is related to trade between different peak and off-peak 
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hours. At certain time periods during the day, Swedish producers will have lower costs than, for 
example, Danish producers, depending on daily patterns, weather conditions and power plants. 
During these hours Swedish producers will export power to Denmark. Likewise, Sweden will 
import power when the costs are lower in Denmark. 
 
In reality, trade flows are very complex and it is rather unlikely that Damsgaard and Greens three 
aspects can be kept apart in practice. Yet the divisions as such are less important, what is 
important in the context of this study is that multinational electricity market integration is 
expected to increase trade across borders, which in turn implies a more efficient use of energy 
sources.  
3.3 Security of supply 
The second distinctive benefit of electricity market integration is the increase of security. Prior to 
the multinational Nordic market, each country and domestic company had to meet the demand for 
electricity using its own capacity and at the same time, withhold an appropriate amount of reserve 
capacity to ensure security of supply. With a common market for electricity, the companies do not 
have to hold the same, high, level of reserve capacity. Instead, lower levels of spare capacity are 
required and the generation capacity can be utilized even more. The fact that a lower amount of 
generation reserve is required to maintain a given level of supply reliability can be considered as a 
second economic benefit of multinational electricity market integration. (Damsgaard and Green, 
2005)  
3.4 Market concentration and market power 
The third distinctive benefit of electricity market integration is related to the competitive 
environment of the electricity market or more specifically, market power. Market power can be 
defined in a variety of ways, however a common assertion is that market power refers to the 
ability of a firm (or a group of firms) to raise and maintain price above the level that would prevail 
under competition (OECD, 2002). In the absence of market power, market price will equal 
marginal cost under efficient production and perfect competition. 
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As previously mentioned, the Nordic electricity markets has historically been dominated by very 
large network industries acting as monopolists in their own local area. However, when the Nord 
Pool power exchange was established the functioning of the electric power market changed; the 
participating countries’ electric power generators had to compete with generators from the whole 
Nord Pool area and as the market for electricity expanded, the large power generators in the 
individual countries got smaller market shares on the common market. An example of this can be 
seen in Sweden, where the four largest electric power generators covered 88 percent of the 
domestic market in 2004, while in the Nord Pool area they only covered 48 percent of the total 
market. (Lundgren, 2012:7) This indicates that larger electric power markets improve the 
conditions for the market to function effectively. 
 
In line with this, Cabral (2000) argues that a lower degree of concentration, i.e. higher number of 
companies on the market, indicates less ability to exercise market power and diminished 
possibilities to raise prices. Cabral also finds support for this negative relationship in his 
econometric calculations. Further support for a negative relationship between market 
concentration and prices comes from eg. Andersson and Bergman (1995), Amundsen et al. (1998) 
and Johnsen et al. (1999), who all find that lower levels of market concentration is related to 
competitive behaviour and lower prices on the electricity market. Amundsen et al. (1998) for 
example study the impact of market power by simulating electricity price formation in Sweden 
and Norway under various assumptions about electricity trade and competitive environment. The 
authors compare the effect of increased competition both under autarky and free trade and find 
that the free-trade price is significantly lower than the autarky prices. Especially if the countries 
have a high degree of monopolistic pricing pre integration, as have been the case in the Nordic 
countries. 
 
Still, concerns have been raised about the Nordic power market’s actual performance and the risk 
of large power companies exploiting their market power. In 2006 for example, the Committee on 
Industry and Trade in the Swedish Parliament held a public inquiry into the electric market - 
partly motivated by the recent years’ sharp increase in electricity prices. In light of the public 
dissent about the performance of the Nordic electricity markets, Fridolfsson and Tangerås (2009) 
conducted a survey over empirical research assessing market power on Nord Pool. Notably, the 
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authors conclude that there is no evidence from previous literature of any systematic exploitation 
of market power on the Nordic power market. 
 
In a more recent study from 2011, Bask, Lundgren and Rudholm examine more specifically how 
the reform of the Nordic electricity markets has affected the competition in the electric supply 
market, Nord Pool. The results show that the electric power generators initially had a small, but 
statistically significant, degree of market power. However, studying the effect of market 
integration, the authors show that the degree of market power has been reduced and finally 
vanished as the market expanded and more countries joined the collaboration. 
3.5 Electricity generation structure 
Electricity market integration is also expected to affect the generation mixture of the region and 
consequently the electricity flow between the participating countries, and ultimately, the price 
level. As previously mentioned, electricity price is heavily based on the marginal costs of 
production and according to Pikk and Viiding (2013) producers with the lowest short-term 
marginal costs are owners of wind turbines and hydro plants. Low levels of hydro generation and 
high levels of relatively more expensive power sources (e.g. fossil fuels) imply that the marginal 
unit more often will be the more expensive power. This in turn will result in higher production 
cost and higher electricity prices. In the same manner production cost, and hence also price, will 
fall with more hydro generation on the market.  
 
Put differently, this means that the Nordic power price is highly dependent on the generation 
structure of the region. Lundgren, Hellström and Rudholm (2008) conclude that the electricity 
production structure differs substantially between the Nordic countries. For example, the 
Lundgren et al. highlight that hydro accounted for 99 percent of the Norwegian power generation 
in 2005 while in Sweden the same year, hydro only accounted for 45 percent of the power 
generation. The remaining part was produced by nuclear power (45 percent) and other thermal 
power sources. According to the authors, the Finnish generation structure is similar to the Swedish 
but with more thermal power and less hydro. Against this background, the authors argue that it is 
reasonable to assume that electricity prices will increase due to Nordic electricity market 
integration, as a consequence of more expensive power sources being the marginal source of 
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electricity. On the other hand, Pikk and Viiding (2013) argue that the majority of new investments 
in generation supply are made with significant help from government support schemes in 
renewable production capacities, which have very low marginal costs. Moreover, since the sale 
price is the same for all producers on the Nord Pool Spot power exchange, the economically most 
efficient production units will earn the most, and the units with the highest bidding price will earn 
just enough to cover their short run marginal costs. As a consequence, rational actors in terms of 
profit-maximising firms may consider the fact that it may be more profitable to use hydropower, 
hence the share of more expensive power sources might also decrease.  
3.6 Electricity price dynamics 
As previously mentioned, the fundamental idea behind a well functioning Nordic power market is 
that price is set according to the marginal cost of electricity production. Friedman (2011) however 
argues that this is almost never the case. Referring to United States electricity markets Friedman 
instead claims that the electricity prices are set at the average cost. Yet studies of the Nordic 
power exchange show another reality. Opposite to what Friedman finds, Bask et al. (2011) and 
Nylund (2013) find that the Nord Pool Spot price closely follows the marginal cost of energy 
production.  
 
When it comes to studies on price effects of multinational electricity market integration the 
existing literature is rather scarce. However, there are a few exceptions. Bask and Widerberg 
(2008) have published an article in which the effect of multinational integration on electricity 
price dynamics is analysed. In the article, the authors conclude that a larger electricity market 
seems to lower the probability of sudden price jumps and that the market is less sensitive to 
shocks after the integration process than it was before. This conclusion is strengthened by 
Lundgren et al. (2008) who also finds that a multinational electricity market appears to handle 
external shocks to supply and demand more efficient than a separate national market. More 
recently Brännlund, Karimu and Söderholm (2012) published a report analysing the price effects 
of the deregulation in the Nordic countries. The article is based on econometric modelling and in 
line with previous researchers, the authors conclude that the Nordic market seems to function as 
an effective market is supposed to. However, neither of these articles nor any other previous 
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papers evaluate the effects of multinational electricity market integration on the actual price level 
in the Nordic power market.  
 
All in all it can be concluded that a majority of experts and analysts believe that the creation of a 
common Nordic power exchange has been fairly successful when it comes to creating a 
competitive and efficient market. Yet the picture is not entirely rosy. There has for example been 
critique towards the widespread belief among regulators and policy analysts that deregulation and 
multinational market integration will yield lower electricity prices. One example of this can be 
seen in Duckwort, Rudkevich and Rosens (1998) article, where the deregulated market for 
electricity in Pennsylvania, USA is studied. Duckworth et al. claim that there are market aspects, 
especially in industries with relatively small number of firms that could offset the benefits of 
increased market competition. In the article, the authors compare the observed electricity prices to 
the “perfectly competitive” electricity prices that would occur from a Nash Equilibrium-based 
bidding. The results show that, as theory would predict, the spot price of electricity decrease as the 
number of generating firms bidding on the exchange market increase. However, even with a 
relatively low market concentration (i.e. high number of firms), market prices are proved to be 
significantly higher than the “perfectly competitive” prices. The results by Duckworth et al., 
suggests that more than 30 firms of equal size are needed to ensure competitive pricing on the 
electricity spot market.  
3.7 Research gaps 
Surveying the previous research analysing electricity markets it can be concluded that a fairly 
extensive part of the literature focus on the competitive part of the market. There are also some 
literature focusing on electricity price dynamics but studies on price dynamics in the context of 
multinational electricity market integration remain are very few. Previous literature, e.g. Cabral 
(2000), Damsgaard and Green (2005) and Lundgren (2012) find that larger power markets 
improve the conditions for the market to function effectively, but the price effects of these 
perceived benefits are not always clear and would benefit from further research.  
 
Early studies such as e.g. Andersson and Bergman (1995) and Johnsen et al. (1999) also indicate 
that electricity spot markets are sensitive to market power and extra susceptible to strategic 
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behaviour. Add to this the fact that market power is sensitive to market expansion and integration, 
as highlighted by Bask et al. (2011), and it becomes evident that there are good reasons to perform 
studies of the Nord Pool Spot market and to understand electricity price formation in competitive 
multinational power markets. Also, with the new market setup determining prices at a common 
power exchange, there are new ways of exploring price formation. Almost 20 years have passed 
since the first multinational power exchange was created in 1996 and the time is thus ready for an 
evaluation of the outcome of the Nordic power exchange.  
4. Aim and research question 
The last decade has seen the introduction of several regulatory measures on the Nordic electricity 
markets, most notably the first multinational power exchange has been created. These measures 
are expected to have changed the price mechanisms of electricity. The overall aim of this thesis is 
to analyse the Nordic multinational electricity market integration and evaluate whether (and to 
what extent) it has affected the electricity price level at the Nordic power exchange. The following 
research question is identified: 
 
How does multinational electricity market integration affect electricity prices at the Nordic power 
exchange? 
5. Theoretical model 
5.1 Two tracks leading towards an electricity price 
Based on the previous research section a theoretical model that explains electricity price can be 
constructed. The ability to exchange electricity between countries in a large region has proven to 
have implications of both technical and economic character. This includes higher utilisation of 
installed capacity, a larger market with more participants that can increase competition and reduce 
market power, and improved security of supply (Nylund 2013:4). In the theoretical model, these 
factors are described as drivers behind the level of electricity price and two parallel tracks are 
considered.  
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The first track of the theoretical model is related to the Nord Pools Spot’s market structure. As 
was previously described in the research section, larger electric power markets helps to improve 
the conditions for the market to function effectively. Larger electricity markets may not only 
increase competition but it may also reduce market power, as pointed out by Lundgren in his 
article from 2012. Add to this the fact that several researchers find support for a negative 
relationship between market concentration and electricity prices and it becomes evident that a link 
is to be expected between multinational electricity market integration and electricity prices at the 
Nordic power exchange. Based on the findings in the previous research section it is reasonable to 
assume that as the common market for electricity grows, i.e. as the traded volumes on the Nord 
Pool spot increase, electricity flow across border intensifies and the market structure of Nord Pool 
spot change. More companies enter the common market for electricity and this leads to higher 
levels of competition and lower levels of market power. Ultimately, this change in market 
structure due to the enlargement and multinational integration of the electricity markets is 
expected to lower the spot price at the Nordic power exchange.  
 
The second track of the theoretical model is related to the cost of producing electricity. Previous 
research show that electricity producers’ pricing methods are affected by multiple factors such as 
variable costs of production, investments and fixed costs and weather. However, the most 
affecting factor is the generation type, and the marginal cost related to the specific generation 
source. Electricity price is heavily based on the marginal costs of production and as previously 
discussed, hydro and wind are considered the cheapest power sources. As for the Nordic 
countries, Lundgren et al. (2008) conclude that the electricity production structure differs 
substantially between the countries. Market integration and hence new participants entering the 
Nord Pool exchange is therefore expected to change the generation structure of the region and 
consequently also the price level. 
 
In summary, according to the theoretical model, the spot price of electricity is assumed to be 
determined as follows. First, the long-run equilibrium price of electricity reflects the marginal cost 
of producing that electricity. Second, the marginal cost and the associated marginal bids are 
determined by changes in market structure and supply structure. In the empirical part of this 
thesis, I would therefore expect that market integration has the following effects on the price. 
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Partly, market integration on the Nord Pool has changed the supply structure towards more 
expensive thermal power. The restructuring of the market thus implies that there is an increased 
probability of more expensive power sources being the marginal source of electricity. This in turn, 
would lead to higher prices as the electricity market becomes more integrated. However, as the 
market becomes more integrated, the composition of the market change and the companies are 
less likely to exploit market power (i.e. to maintain prices that are higher than the lowest possible 
marginal cost of production). In addition to this, multinational electricity market integration is 
expected to bring additional economic benefits in terms of security of supply, increased 
investments and efficient use of the transmission infrastructure. The aggregated effect of 
integration on prices is therefore expected to be negative, i.e. as market becomes more integrated 
prices are expected to decrease. 
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Figure 5.1 Graphic presentation of theoretical model. 
 
 
5.2 Delimitations of the theoretical model 
To construct a comprehensive model of how the price of electricity is set is a huge task and 
outside the scope of a study this size. The model constructed in this thesis focuses on the effects of 
electricity market integration and factors closely linked to market structure and the supply side of 
electricity, such as generation composition, market share of main actors and companies. 
Moreover, it is an analysis of the multinational spot price. Domestic policy areas that are likely to 
affect the domestic electricity price, such as tax, technical standards on transmission infrastructure 
and bottlenecks, are therefore not taken into account. Nor are entire policy areas such as 
environmental standards and emission allowances that may affect the production cost for 
electricity generation based on fossil fuel. 
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5.3 Hypothesis derived from the theoretical model 
According to the theoretical model, electricity prices should be lower if the electricity markets 
have been liberalised and integrated, compared to years where this is not the case. In other words, 
multinational electricity market integration is expected to have a negative effect on prices. This 
means that the electricity price is expected to be low during the years when the common market 
trading is high, the electricity flow across border is high, market shares of the main companies are 
low, market concentration is low and change in generation structure high. 
6. Method and operationalisation 
6.1 Delimitations  
The graphic presentation of the theoretical model identifies a number of explanatory factors and 
causalities, although to examine them all would constitute a huge task. In order to keep this 
analysis within a reasonable size while at the same time covering the central parts of the 
theoretical model, a number of delimitations will be made. 
 
Due to the fact that the Nordic countries effort to create a multinational electricity market is the 
main focus of this thesis, most attention will be given to factors within this field. The size of the 
common power exchange and the flow of electricity across borders stand out as vital factors to 
examine. As theorized it is also important to take into account the characteristics of the market in 
terms of number of companies and market shares. Hence these variables are included in the 
empirical study. Previous research has also shown that generation structure plays an important 
role for the price level of electricity and due to the relative ease in obtaining data within this area 
this factor will also be included in the empirical study. 
 
The rest of the factors in the theoretical model (security of supply, transmission infrastructure, 
investments) will not be included in the empirical part of this study. However, it is important to 
keep these aspects in mind when discussing the results and future research. 
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6.2 Data sources 
The vast majority of the data used in the empirical study have been provided by three main data 
sources: Nord Pool, European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
(ENTSO-E) and the Nordic Energy Regulators (NordREG). The data cover the time period week 
1, 1996 to week 52, 2014. The time span stretches from 1996 to 2014 since the Nord Pool power 
exchange was created in 1996, hence data on Nord Pool price and other market indicators are only 
available from 1996 and onwards. All in all, the sample consists of 988 weekly observations. 
 
Nord Pool compiles data in its FTP database for various types of indicators related to the physical 
Elspot market. The FTP database constitutes the key data source for this thesis with regards to 
price information and market indicators such as traded volume and number of participants. 
Besides Nord Pool, data on market indicators have been obtained from NordREG which serves as 
a second important data source for this thesis. NordREG compiles reports annually that describes 
the state of the Nordic electricity market. These reports provide useful information about the 
Nordic power exchange and serve as a complement to Nord Pool’s FTP database, especially when 
it comes to market size indicators in terms of total volume as share of electricity consumption.  
 
Apart from Nord Pool and NordREG, the European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Electricity constitutes the third main statistical source of this thesis. The ENTSO-E statistical 
database encompasses a range of historical data sets regarding power systems and the data of 
interest for this study is related to electricity flow statistics. However, the database only contains 
data for the years 2010-2014 since the organisation was established 2009. Data for the years 2009 
and before have been compiled by ENTSO-E’s predecessors and are only available in ENTSO-E’s 
published reports. The publications of interest for this study relates to the section called “Nordel”. 
 
Additional data sources used in this study is Sweden Energy AB and Eurostat. Eurostat provide 
data on GDP and Sweden Energy AB compiles reports annually that describe the Swedish 
electricity market. Especially its latest report “The electricity year 2014” provide useful 
information about market shares of main companies at the Nordic electricity market. The 
drawback with the Sweden Energy data is that it only exists for the period 2002-2014. But to the 
author’s knowledge, the data cannot be obtained elsewhere and the variable is considered too 
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important to be left out of the statistical analysis. Data on market shares is essential for assessing 
market competition and it provides a useful complement to the other market indicator measuring 
number of participants at the market. This means that the study will examine a maximum of 
twelve years when the market share variable is included in the statistical model. Although a longer 
time span would be ideal, the period represents a rather extensive amount of years and a time 
where multinational electricity market integration has increased, and the effects thereof, should be 
clear. 
 
Also note that the data compiled by ENTSO-E, NordREG and Swedish Energy AB is annual and 
not weekly. For a complete list of explanatory variables and their missing values see Appendix I 
table 1. The descriptive statistics (mean, max, min, dev, etc) of the data are reported in the same 
Appendix, table 1.  
6.3 How to measure electricity price 
The price of electricity can be measured in a variety of ways. First off, it is important to underline 
that price for industrial and domestic consumers differ due to extra cost of distributional networks 
for domestic consumers. On top of this, national taxes are added. The aim of this thesis is to study 
the Nordic power exchange and not the individual electricity markets. Hence the price for 
industrial consumers is more important for this study than the domestic area prices. Analysing the 
domestic area prices would introduce too much “noise” in the analysis in terms of transmission 
constraints and domestic policy differences. Using the industrial spot price allows for a more in-
depth analysis of market integration effects and it enables a study that more clearly isolate the 
factors influencing the market price.  
 
The system spot price is measured in Euro per megawatt hour and data is obtained from Nord 
Pool Spot. The price serie is constructed using weekly prices and in the theoretical model the spot 
price for electricity without any taxes or transmission constraints will be used as dependent price 
variable. 
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Before 2000, the spot price was referred to in Norwegian crowns. The weekly prices 1996-2000 
have therefore been converted to Euro using the monthly exchange rate reported by Antweiler 
(2015). 
6.4 How to measure competition 
In a perfectly competitive market, there will be a large number of sellers. According to economic 
theory, the number of sellers could on the one hand be an indicator of economies of scale and on 
the other hand an indicator of price taking behaviour and utilization of market power in general. 
Nord Pool reports data on number of participants on the Nord Pool Spot market and this is one 
way to measure market concentration. However, it is flawed in the sense that it cannot distinguish 
between situations where a few big companies holds almost the entire market compared to 
situations where numerous smaller companies share the market. To measure this it is important to 
consider the cumulative market share of the main companies.  
 
To measure the cumulative market share of the main companies an arbitrary boundary of what can 
be considered a main company must be set. From previous studies it is clear that the Nordic 
market is dominated by four power generation companies; Vattenfall, Fortum, E.ON and 
Statkraft. (Hellmer and Wårell, 2009:3237; Fridolfsson and Tangerås, 2009:3682) These four 
companies control a majority of the electricity production on the national markets and will 
constitute the “main companies” of this thesis.  
 
The market shares of the four main companies will be calculated as the company's production 
share of the total electricity production in the Nordic countries. The reason why the total 
electricity production is the basis for the calculation, and not only the electricity traded at Nord 
Pool Spot, is because of data limitations. Nord Pool does not provide data on traded volumes by 
producer, nor does the national agencies such as e.g. Swedish Energy AB. The only data 
available, to the authors knowledge, is the company’s production in relation to the total electricity 
production in the Nordic countries. This means that the indicator will not reflect the development 
on the Nord Pool Spot market, but the development in the Nordic countries. The measurement is 
still considered adequate for the purpose of this study since it reflects the company’s market 
shares on the multinational Nordic market. Another argument for this measurement is that without 
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a well-functioning wholesale market the development of a competitive exchange market is not 
feasible. 
 
A high number of participants on the Nord Pool Spot market, and low score of the cumulative 
market share of main companies on the Nordic market would, according to the theoretical model, 
indicate a competitive market and lower prices. Hence competition will be operationalised as two 
separate variables, one measuring the number of participants on the market, and one measuring 
the cumulative market share of the four largest companies on the market. The variable containing 
information about the number of participants is expected to have a negative relationship with 
price, i.e. when the number of companies increases, competition increases and prices fall. The 
variable on cumulative market share is expected to have a positive relationship with price, i.e. as 
the main companies increase their market shares competition is reduced and prices increase.  
6.5 How to measure multinational integration  
In this thesis, market integration is understood as a continuous event occurring over time. In line 
with this definition, the integration effect will be measured through a number of continuous 
variables. An alternative method would be to use dummy variables for integration, as Lundgren et 
al. do in their article from 2008. However, a dummy approach implies that market integration is a 
single event occurring at a certain time(s) in history. It would not enable an analysis of the 
continuous effect of market integration but rather represent a one-time change in prices. The 
degree of market integration will therefore be measured through a number of market indicators 
representing the level of integration. 
 
The first multinational market integration variable is the total volume traded at the Nord Pool Spot 
market. The amount of electricity traded on the Nord Pool power exchange is measured in 
gigawatt-hours per week and data is obtained from Nord Pool’s FTP server. The variable helps to 
illustrate the size of the market and its activity. However, the measurement is flawed in the sense 
that it does not say anything about the relative size of the market. A large amount of traded 
volumes does not necessarily mean that the countries are integrated. To account for this, a second 
variable will be included which measures the volumes in the spot market as share of the total 
Nordic electricity consumption. Data on traded volumes as share of total consumption can be 
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obtained from the “Nordic energy market reports” published annually by NordREG. These reports 
are compiled to give the reader an overview of the development of the Nordic energy market and 
in the associated statistical package there is a list of relevant indicators for the electricity market.  
 
Because integration aims to increase trade across borders measures of electricity flow across 
borders can be used as a third variable and indicator of multinational market integration. The 
measurement also serves as a complement to the previous variables since a growing market for 
common trade not necessarily implies a more integrated market. One must also consider the flow 
of electricity across borders. The European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E) encompasses a range of historical data sets within the field of power 
systems, among others there is a data set measuring the annual flow of electricity between the 
Nordic countries. The data is categorised according to the five boundaries of Scandinavia, 
measuring the import and export of electricity between Sweden and Finland (1), Sweden and 
Denmark (2), Sweden and Norway (3), Denmark and Norway (4) and Norway and Finland (5). 
An average exchange rate per border is then calculated by summarizing the yearly exchange rates 
and dividing by five. The average exchange rate per border is measured in gigawatt-hours per 
year.  
 
In conclusion, multinational market integration is operationalised as three different variables. The 
first two variables are rather size oriented. Both the variables are expected to have a negative 
relationship with the price of electricity, i.e. as the total traded volume increases and a larger share 
of the electricity consumption goes through the common spot market, the multinational market 
grows and efficiency gains make the price decrease. As for the third variable for multinational 
market integration, electricity flows across borders, the variable is expected to have a negative 
relationship with the price of electricity, meaning that as electricity flow across borders increase 
price decrease. 
 
Only two of the three multinational market integration variables will be included in the statistical 
model. The variable “total traded volume” and the variable “volume as share of total electricity 
consumption” both measure the same thing but in different ways and due to the high risk of 
multicollinearity only “total traded volume” will be included in the statistical model.  
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6.6 How to measure generation structure 
As shown in the section of previous research, generation type and supply structure play a vital role 
in electricity price formation and multinational electricity market integration. Data on generation 
capacity by power source in the Nordic countries can be obtained from ENTSO-E and 
NordREG’s annual reports. Data is reported in megawatt, the 31st of December each year.  
 
Based on the data from ENTSO-E and NordREG, generation structure is then calculated and 
operationalised as one variable measuring the total change in generation structure at the Nordic 
power market. The reason for calculating one variable measuring the total change at the market 
and not several different variables for each generation source is because this study mainly focuses 
on multinational electricity market integration and price. The aim is not to thoroughly analyse 
how integration affect the generation structure in the region and in light of this, it is considered 
adequate to measure the general change at the market. 
 
The variable is calculated in two steps. First, the annual share of each power source is calculated, 
i.e. the share of capacity that comes from hydropower, the share of capacity that comes from 
nuclear power, the share of capacity that comes from other thermal power and the share of 
capacity that comes from other renewable power. Each variable is calculated as the annual share 
of the total generation capacity of the Nord Pool participating countries. Hence data for 1996 and 
1997 illustrates the generation structure of Sweden and Norway. Finland joins the Nord Pool 
market in 1998 and Denmark in 2000. Second, in order to create one variable measuring the 
change in generation structure at the common power market, the variables are merged into one 
variable measuring the total change in generation structure from one year to the following year. 
The variable is calculated as the sum of the percentage change between the different power 
sources each year. E.g. if the share of hydro generation increase by one percent from year one to 
year two, and the share of nuclear generation decrease by one percent during the same time, the 
total change in generation structure from year one to year two equals one percent. Hence if the 
variable increases, it indicates that the market structure of the common power market change. 
However, it does not say anything about which power sources that increase or decrease. 
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The generation structure variable is expected to have a negative relationship with price, assuming 
that companies are rational actors striving to maximize their profits by lowering their production 
costs. As integration increase, the generation structure of the common power market change 
towards less expensive power (i.e. the variable “change in generation structure” increase) and 
prices decrease. 
6.7 Control variables 
Because this thesis does not create a comprehensive model on electricity pricing it is important to 
control for other factors that might affect the spot price at the Nordic power exchange. There are a 
few factors that are considered important to the spot price of electricity. 
 
It has been concluded that generation type is important for the marginal cost of producing 
electricity and hence also for electricity pricing. Closely related to this discussion is the question 
about hydro reservoir levels. A low level in hydro reservoirs will mean that producers use more 
expensive sources which will result in a higher production cost and potentially also higher 
electricity prices. In the same manner production cost will fall with more water in the reservoirs. 
(Nord Pool Spot, 2016) Hence the Nordic power price is also dependent on both rainfall levels 
and access to nuclear power and the price of other sources. The aim of this thesis is not to 
determine all potential factors that could affect electricity price but rather to show the potential 
effects of market integration on electricity price. However, since rainfall levels and fuel price such 
as oil have been highlighted as important factors behind electricity price formation I will control 
for these factors in the econometric model.  
 
Temperature might be another reason behind rising electricity prices. As temperature decreases, 
the demand for electricity increases and the electricity price is therefore likely to increase. The 
temperature variable is aggregated and measures the average mean in Celsius for Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Denmark, 1996-2013. For reasons of time, data has been obtained from the 
appendix of Romarker and Wennerström (2015). In their appendix, the authors have calculated an 
aggregated yearly mean for the Nordic countries based on data from the Swedish Meteorological 
and Hydrological Institute (SMHI), the Norwegian Meteorological Institute, the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute (FMI) and the Danish Meteorological Institute. 
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GDP per capita will be used to control for the level of economic development. The variable is 
obtained from Eurostat and measures the real average value of GDP per capita for Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Denmark in EUR per inhabitant.  
6.8 Statistical method 
This thesis uses a quantitative approach with times series data from 1996 to 2014. The method 
used is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression. This method was chosen because it is 
a generally accepted and straightforward method of making statistical inference. 
 
When analysing time series data, there are some statistical problems that need to be dealt with. 
One problem stemming from the time dimension of the data is the risk for autocorrelation. Put 
simply, autocorrelation means that the observations are correlated across time, that the error term 
is correlated with error terms from previous years in the time series. This in turn might cause bias 
results and an outcome where our results look more statistical significant than they really are. A 
Durbin Watson test helps to identify any serial correlation and the results indicate that this is a 
problem since the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the data is rejected. In an effort to solve 
this problem, a lagged dependent variable will be used in the model. 
 
Another problem stemming from the time dimension is the risk of non-stationary data, i.e. that 
there is a common trend in the data that may mislead the results. A high correlation in the data 
could be the result of a similar trend among the indicators, moving upwards or downwards at the 
same time. To make sure that the time series are stationary a Dickey Fuller test is conducted. The 
results confirm that all variables appear to be stationary. Nevertheless, both the price variable and 
the variable for traded volumes contain seasonal patterns, in the short run (weekly patterns) as 
well as the long run (intra yearly patterns). In order to capture the short run seasonality, weekly 
prices are used. Seasonality within the years is captured by including weather related variables in 
the regression model. Both the inflow of water to the reservoirs in terms of rainfall and the 
average temperature show seasonal patterns. Hence, these variables should be useful in order to 
capture seasonality in the electricity price. 
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A third aspect that is important to consider in regression analysis is the potential co variation or 
correlation between the independent variables, also known as multicollinearity. If there is a 
problem of multicollinearity in the model, the standard errors of the variables are affected and 
subsequently also the statistical inference (Wooldridge, 2013: 83-85). However, the average VIF-
value of the model in this study is substantially lower than 10 and multicollinearity does not 
appear to be a problem. Although one of the variables has an individual VIF-value larger than 11 
and two variables are close to the limit with VIF-values between 6 and 7. This is a cause for 
concern and the individual effect of these variables therefore have to be treated with caution.1  
 
Finally, to account for any heteroscedasticity, i.e. when the error terms of the variables are not 
normally distributed, a robust method will be used.2 This method is commonly used and helps to 
correct the modelling errors and contribute to valid statistical tests of significance.  
 
As always with quantitative methods the causal direction can be questioned. However, since the 
model that is being tested is backed up by theory, reasonable arguments on the causal directions 
can be made. 
6.9 Statistical hypothesis and equation 
In order to answer the research question a statistical hypothesis can be derived. The hypothesis 
reads as follows:  
 
The multinational integration variables; cross border flow and total traded volume at Nord Pool 
Spot are expected to have negative relationships with price levels, i.e. coefficients are significant 
and negative. The cumulative market share of the four main companies is expected to have a 
positive relationship with price while the number of companies is expected to have a negative 
relationship with price levels. The change in generation is expected to have a negative relationship 
with price level.  
 
                                               
1 See Appendix I table 2 for VIF values 
2 Robust option in Stata 
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As for the control variables, temperature and rainfalls are expected to have negative relationships 
with price levels. GDP per capita is expected to have a positive relationship with price levels. 
 
In mathematical terms, this is the econometric model to be estimated: 
ln(𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)𝑡 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1 ln(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠)𝑡 − 𝛽2 ln(𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤)𝑡 
−𝛽3𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 − 𝛽5𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
−𝛽6𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 − 𝛽7𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−51 + 𝛽9 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
β is the coefficient, e is the error term and t is the time period specified as week per year. The 
variables spot price, cross border flow and traded volumes are expressed in logarithmic form in 
order make them unit-independent. This offers a more straightforward interpretation and the 
possibility to interpret the relationship as elasticity. If for example, the cumulative market share of 
main entities increases by one percentage point the potential change in spot price is interpreted in 
percent.  
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7. Results 
7.1 Presentation of variables – trend and observations 
The following section will present the characteristics of the dependent variable, electricity spot 
price and the key independent variables; traded volumes at Nord Pool Spot, cross border 
electricity flow, number of participants on the Nord Pool Spot market and the cumulative market 
share of the four main companies on the market. A frequency distribution of the dependent 
variable is presented in Appendix I. 
 
Figure 7.1 The Nord Pool Spot price, 1996-2014. 
Euro per megawatt-hour  
 
Comment: The figure illustrates how the spot price has developed at the Nord Pool Spot market, weekly 1996-2014. 
The Y-axis measures EUR per MWh and the X-axis represents the time dimension measured in years.  
Source: Nord Pool FTP server  
 
Figure 7.1 above shows the fluctuations of the spot price during the time period of this study. The 
blue line represents the weekly spot price and the red line represents the seasonal adjusted spot 
price in terms of the moving average of the weekly spot price. As suspected, the blue line 
 34 
fluctuates a lot over time and this strengthens the suspicion that the spot price is determined by 
seasonal factors such as temperature and rain levels. Hence, this is controlled for in the statistical 
model.  
 
The figure also shows that there is a clear price decrease during the early years of the Nord Pool 
Spot market, from 1996 to approximately 2000, which is interesting considering the fact that the 
period coincides with the integration period of the Nordic electricity markets. Sweden joined Nord 
Pool in 1996, Finland in 1998 and Denmark 2000. Hence the early price decrease might be a sign 
of integration effects. However in the long run, 1996-2014, there is no clear downward price 
trend. The graph shows rather the opposite, since 2000 there has been a price increase up until 
2011 when there is a slight price decrease again. In 2015 the price level is basically at the same 
level as in 1996.  
 
Figure 7.2 Traded volumes at Nord Pool Spot market, 1996-2014. 
Gigawatt-hours  
 
Comment: The figure illustrates how the traded volume has developed at the Nord Pool Spot market, weekly 1996-
2014. The Y-axis measures GWh and the X-axis represents the time dimension measured in years.  
Source: Nord Pool FTP server  
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Figure 7.3 Traded volumes as share of electricity consumption, 1997-2014. 
Share (%) of total Nordic electricity consumption 
 
Comment: The figure illustrates traded volumes at Nord Pool Spot as share (%) of the total Nordic electricity 
consumption per year, 1997-2014. The Y-axis measures percent and the X-axis represents the time dimension 
measured in years. Source: NordREG. 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the amount of electricity traded on Nord Pool power exchange during the period 
1996-2014 and figure 7.3 shows the percentage of electricity as share of total consumption of 
electricity in the Nordic countries for each year of this thesis. Both figures illustrate an extensive 
growth of the Nordic power market over time. Figure 7.2 shows that the amount of electricity 
handled by the Nord Pool Spot has more than tenfold during the time period of this study. Figure 
7.3 illustrates this significant growth as percentage of the total electricity consumption in the 
Nordic countries. In 1996, the Nord Pool Spot market covered approximately 6 percent of the 
electricity consumed in the Nordic countries. In 2013, the market covered about 90 percent. This 
indicates that the liquidity of spot market has increased over time. Market liquidity in turn, is 
essential to the function of wholesale markets, as it allows the formation of competitive prices. 
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Figure 7.4 Average cross border electricity flows in the Nordic countries, 1996-2014. 
Gigawatt-hours 
 
Comment: The figure illustrates the amount of electricity that flows across the five borders of the Nordic countries per 
year, 1997-2014. A list of country borders can be found in Appendix I, table 3. The Y-axis measures GWh and the X-
axis represents the time dimension measured in years. Source: ENTSO-E. 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the average cross border flow of electricity between the Nordic countries 1996 
to 2013. The graph fluctuates a bit but confirms that the average flow of electricity across borders 
has increased over time. As suspected, it seems as if integration coincides with intensified 
electricity flows across borders. This indicates that the common market for electricity has grown 
not only in terms of traded volumes but also in terms of exchange between the participating 
countries.  
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Figure 7.5 Cumulative market shares of main companies, 2002-2014. 
Share (%) of total installed capacity in the Nordic countries 
 
Comment: The figure illustrates the cumulative market share of the four main companies (Vattenfall, Fortum, E.ON 
and Statkraft) at the Nordic electricity market, 2002-2014. The Y-axis measures the share (%) of total installed 
capacity in the Nordic countries and the X-axis represent the time dimension measured in years.  
Source: Sweden Energy AB (2014) 
 
Figure 7.5 shows the cumulative market share of the five main companies as percentage of total 
installed capacity in the Nordic countries, 2002-2014. The trend is rather modest but it implies a 
move towards a slightly more concentrated market where the main companies are growing bigger 
or at least maintaining their market share. However, before drawing any conclusions one must 
also consider the number of participants trading on Nord Pool Spot’s market. As figure 7.6 shows 
below, there is an increasing trend and the number of participants has increased substantially over 
time, from 148 participants in 1996 to 377 participants in 2014. This indicates a market where 
more companies are active and according to theory, this should have a lowering effect on price 
since an increasing number of companies are assumed to increase competition.  
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Figure 7.6 Participants at the Nord Pool Spot market, 1996-2014. 
Quantity 
 
Comment: The figure illustrates the number of participants on the Nord Pool Spot market and how it has developed 
per year, 1996-2014. The Y-axis measures the number of participants and the X-axis represent the time dimension 
measured in years. Source: Nord Pool FTP server. 
7.2 The effect of market integration on electricity price 
In an effort to explain the above-presented variances and the underlying drivers of change, the 
following section will present the regression results and examine the relationship between market 
integration and price. 
 
Table 7.1 presents the estimated results for the regressions made in the data analysis of equation 
(1). In this study, the effect of multinational electricity market integration is measured via two 
separate variables, partly via the traded volume variable from Nord Pool Spot and partly via the 
electricity flow variable from ENTSO-E. Studying the regression results in table 7.1, a few 
observations can be mentioned.  
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First, through all three columns in table 7.1, the coefficient for traded volume is significantly 
positive. This means that, opposite to what was expected, traded volumes appears to have a 
positive impact on the spot price. As the power market grow and more electricity is traded at the 
Nord Pool Spot market, prices rise. The positive relationship between traded volumes and price is 
rather surprising given that economic theory often argue that increased market integration is 
expected to lower prices. A potential explanation to the unexpected (positive) sign of the 
coefficient could be that there are underlying factors mediating the relationship between the 
variables. One such factor could be import from third countries. Electricity generators at the Nord 
Pool power market might have had to import electricity from third countries (e.g. Germany, 
Russia or Poland) during peak load hours or in times of severe supply shocks. Imports from third 
countries are often associated with higher costs and this could potentially explain why there is a 
price increase when traded volumes at Nord Pool Spot increase. It is also worth mentioning that 
the positive relationship between traded volumes and price could be an indicator of insufficient 
measurement. Just because electricity is traded on a common power market, it does not 
necessarily mean that the countries are integrated, i.e. that the countries exchange electricity with 
each other. The results may be an indicator of distribution still being mainly domestic, potentially 
due to transmission constrains in the cross border grid systems. However, it is important to 
underline that the coefficient for traded volumes is relatively small, indicating that the effect is 
rather weak. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the multivariate regression in column 
three shows that if traded volumes per week increase by one percentage point, the weekly spot 
price of electricity will also increase, with 0,2 percent on average.  
 
As for the other multinational integration variable measuring the average electricity flow across 
borders, the coefficient is more in line with what was expected. At least in column three, which 
represents the full model. Initially, in the bivariate regression, the explanatory variable shows a 
significantly positive effect on price meaning that as the average flow of electricity increase 
between the Nordic countries, prices rise. However, when the full model is run and control 
variables are added the coefficient becomes significantly negative. Hence it can be concluded that 
the average flow of electricity across the Nordic borders has a significantly negative effect on 
prices. As more electricity flow across the Nordic borders, the spot price of electricity decrease. 
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The estimated results tells us that a one percentage point increase of the average flow of electricity 
across borders will result in a spot price decrease of 0,8 percent on average. 
 
Using the variables as indicators of multinational electricity market integration the regression 
results imply rather mixed signals. It can be concluded that size and flow matter for the level of 
electricity price, although the effects are not entirely as expected. On the one hand, the results 
indicate that market integration in terms of interconnectivity and electricity flow across borders 
has a negative effect on prices, i.e. as the average flow of electricity increase, prices on electricity 
decrease. On the other hand and in contrast to what was expected, the results also indicate that 
market integration in terms of traded volumes has a positive effect on prices, i.e. as more 
electricity is traded on the common market for electricity, prices on electricity increase. This 
means that the integration variables of this study work in different directions, one variable drives 
up the electricity spot price and the other one drives down the electricity spot price. The overall 
effect of electricity market integration on price is therefore precarious to determine. It could be 
argued that the combined effect is likely to be negative, since the estimated (negative)effect of the 
second variable, electricity flow, is relatively strong compared to the estimated (positive)effect of 
the first variable, traded volumes. Though the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable 
contradicts this argument as it indicates that there has not been any substantial price decrease of 
the spot price 1996-2014. The descriptive statistics also show that the market has been growing 
substantially when it comes to traded volumes while the increase in terms of electricity flow 
across borders have been more modest. This could potentially explain why there is no overall 
price decrease in the descriptive statistics over time. The market has simply seen a much higher 
increase in traded volumes than in flow across borders, which evens out the integration effect. 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the data of this study finds support for the presumed 
relationship between market integration and electricity prices at the Nordic power exchange. 
Although it does not find support for any conclusion that multinational electricity market 
integration necessarily lowers the electricity price. 
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7.3 The effect of market structure on electricity price 
Studying the bivariate regression results of table 7.1 it can be concluded that the market structure 
variables prove to have a small but significantly positive relationship with electricity price. 
Although when the full model is run and controls are added, the results change and a few things 
are worth noting.  
 
First, the significance disappears for the market structure variable measuring the cumulative 
market share of the main entities. The coefficient is still positive, as expected by the model, 
indicating that as the market share of the four main companies on the Nordic electricity market 
increase, price rise. Nevertheless, the variable is not significant and the conclusion is therefore 
that the data do not support any presumed relationship between market shares and electricity 
price.   
 
The second observation to be made is that the sign of the coefficient measuring the number of 
participants on the Nord Pool Spot market becomes negative when the full model is run. The 
effect on price is rather small but the coefficient is significant and the estimated result tells us that 
for every extra participant on the Nord Pool Spot market, the electricity spot price decrease by 
0,002 percent on average. In line with what has been theoretically argued, the coefficient indicates 
that as more companies establish on the electricity market, prices decrease.  
7.4 Generation structure, lagged dependent and control variables 
In line with what has been previously argued about the importance of generation type and 
associated production costs, the bivariate regression results in table 7.1 show that the generation 
structure variable has a negative effect on price. This means that as the generation structure 
change on the electricity market, prices decrease. The data used in this study does not show 
exactly how the generation structure has changed, i.e. which power source that has 
grown/decreased relative the other. Although the results confirm what many researchers such as 
Lundgren et al. (2008) and Pikk and Viiding (2013) have argued before, that changes in 
generation structure is a driving force behind the electricity price level. Also, since the sign of the 
coefficient is negative, it could be argued that the change in generation structure represents a 
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change towards less expensive power sources being the marginal source of electricity. An 
interesting observation considering the fact that previous researchers, e.g. Lundgren (2008), argue 
that there is an increased probability of more expensive thermal power being the marginal source 
of electricity when that Nordic countries integrate. However, the results turn insignificant when 
the full model is run and even if the coefficient is still negative the data does not support any 
conclusion about the explanatory variable and its effect on price.  
 
As suspected the lagged dependent variable has a relatively large effect on the dependent variable, 
which is quite logical due to the inherent serial correlation that prices tend to have over time. The 
variable is still significant when lagged oil price is included to the model, indicating that the spot 
price is determined both by previous electricity prices and by previous years oil prices. 
 
The variables controlling for seasonal differences also show significant bivariate results, 
indicating a relationship between temperature and electricity price and between rain levels and 
electricity price. Yet when the full model is run, the significance disappears. The same goes for 
the BNP variable, which initially proves to have a rather large effect on electricity price. But when 
the full model is run the significance disappears. 
7.5 Full model 
As shown in table 7.1, three of the key explanatory variables have statistically significant effect on 
the spot price when the full model is run in column three.  
 
Both integration variables prove to have significant effects on the electricity spot price and it can 
be concluded that there is a relationship between market integration, measured as traded volumes 
and average electricity flow across borders, and the electricity price at Nord Pool Spot. However, 
the data does not support any conclusion that multinational electricity market integration 
necessarily lowers the electricity price. Intensified electricity flow across borders appears to be a 
factor that contributes to a price decrease. The variable is expressed in logarithmic form and the 
estimated coefficient 0.745 tells us that if the average cross borders electricity flow increase with 
one percentage point, the weekly price will decrease with 0.745 percent on average. The size of 
the power market on the other hand, measured as traded volumes, appears to be a factor that 
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contributes to a price increase. The coefficient 0.171 tells us that if traded volumes increase with 
one percentage point, the price will increase with 0.171 percent on average. This is a rather small 
effect but yet statistically significant and it indicates that as the market grow in terms of traded 
volumes, the spot price increase. Not the reversed as expected by theory.  
 
In general it can thus be concluded that flow of electricity is an important factor that contributes to 
the lowering of prices at the Nordic power exchange. Then what about the size of the market? 
Before drawing any conclusions here it is important to study the third statistically significant 
explanatory variable; the number of participants on the Nord Pool Spot market. The variable 
indicates that as the market grows in terms of participants, prices decrease. When it comes to the 
market structure variables the full model indicates that the measures taken by the Nordic countries 
to create a common power exchange seem to have contributed to the liberalisation of the market 
and increased competition. On the other hand, no effect could be seen with regards to the other 
market structure variable measuring the cumulative market share of the main companies and this 
somewhat weakens the conclusion about a liberalised energy market.  
 
In conclusion, both size and flow appear to be essential factors behind the electricity price level at 
the Nordic power exchange. The estimated results indicate that the flow of electricity and size in 
terms of participants on the market contribute to a decrease in spot price, while size in terms of 
traded volumes at the market contributes to an increase in spot price. 
7.6 Alternative model – exclusion of cumulative market share data  
As mentioned in the discussion regarding data, statistics on market share was only available 
between 2002 -2014 and the limited time dimension raised concerns for this study. To test if this 
affects the results the same models are run without the variable market share. Initially, the results 
looks very similar to the ones presented in appendix II. However, when the full model is run, the 
coefficients for cross border flow and number of participants turns significantly positive. This 
weakens the previous conclusions about the negative relationship between the two variables and 
price and it means that the above presented results must be treated with caution. In contrast to 
what has been previously discussed about the negative effects of market integration, the 
alternative model indicates that all integration variables, as well as the variable measuring 
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participants on the market, have a positive effect on price, i.e. as market expand and flow across 
border intensifies, prices rise. 
 
This could potentially be the result of a more precise modelling due to the increased number of 
observations in the alternative model. Although, it could also be explained by the fact that the 
market share variable is acting as a mediating variable, disturbing the causal relationship between 
the independent variables and price. This explanation is also strengthened considering the 
bivariate regression results in column one, table 7.1, where it is confirmed that market share is a 
significant predictor of the dependent variable and thus should be included in the model to avoid 
omitted variables bias. 
 
Another observation worth mentioning is that the coefficient for generation structure becomes 
statistically significant in the alternative model. This strengthens the previous discussion about 
changes in generation structure and how it might affect the electricity price level. The increased 
significance level can be explained in similar terms as before and is probably to find in the fact 
that the alternative model represents the whole time period with data for 1996-2014. During the 
early years of Nord Pool there were large changes in generation structure due to new countries 
entering the market with different electricity production structures. 
 
For the rest of the variables, the significance level increases which strengthens the previous 
conclusions about their effect on price.  
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Table 7.1 Estimated results for the Nord Pool Spot market. Spot price. 
DV: ln(Electricity spot 
price, €/MWh) 
Bivariate 
regressions 
Multivariate 
regression  
without controls 
Multivariate 
regression  
with controls 
Explanatory variables    
Lagged dependent (t-1) 0.032***  
(0.001) 
0.022***  
0.001 
0.023*** 
0.001 
ln(Traded volumes, 
MWh) 
0.430***  
(0.018) 
0.174***  
0.048 
0.171***  
0.047 
ln(Cross border flow, 
MWh) 
1.409***  
(0.093) 
-0.265**  
0.129 
-0.745* 
0.475 
Number of participants 0.003***  
(0.0000) 
-0.0009* 
0.0005 
-0.002* 
0.002 
Cum share of main 
entities 
0.045***  
(0.004) 
0.011**  
0.005 
0.057 
0.042 
Change in generation 
structure 
-0.038***  
(0.002) 
0.0005 
0.003 
-0.011  
0.015 
Control variables    
Temperature (Celsius) -0.048*  
(0.025) 
 0.089 
0.103 
Rain levels (mm) -0.003***  
(0.0003) 
 -0.0004 
0.0006 
Oil price (t-52) .008***  
(.0004) 
 0.005 
0.004 
ln(BNP per capita, €) 3.742***  
(0.188) 
 -6.700 
6.071 
Constant - 4.007 80.144 
R-square (within) - 0.86 0.86 
Observations (N) - 415 415 
Significance: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.001 
Source: Nord Pool FTP server, ENTSO-E annual statistics (2008), ENTO-E database, NordREG market integration 
reports, Swedish Energy AB, Eurostat.  
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8. Concluding discussion 
8.1 How does multinational electricity market integration affect electricity prices 
at the Nordic power exchange? 
This thesis has researched the effects of multinational electricity market integration on electricity 
prices at the Nordic power exchange. The theory behind the theoretical model presented in chapter 
five was that multinational power markets provide a number of distinctive benefits that would 
lower the spot price at the Nordic power exchange. It was pointed out that increased integration on 
multinational power markets provide more supply security, efficient use of installed capacity, 
lower trading costs and increased competition for the market participants – integration effects that 
were expected to ultimately lower the electricity price at the Nordic power exchange. A regression 
analysis was performed to explore the causal relationship between multinational electricity market 
integration and electricity price using weekly data from 1996 to 2014. Multinational integration 
was understood as an increase in volume traded at the Nord Pool Spot market and an increase in 
average flow of electricity across the Nordic borders.  
 
As is clear from the models presented in the result section, multinational electricity market 
integration does have a significant effect on spot prices at the Nordic exchange market. Both size 
and flow matters for the price level, although not entirely as expected by the theoretical model. 
The integration variables actually appear to work in opposite directions and the overall effect of 
integration on price is therefore precarious to determine. The results indicate that increased flow 
of electricity across borders tends to drive down the electricity price while the size of the market 
in terms of total trade tends to drive up the price. In light of these results, it is interesting to note 
that there has been a rapid increase in traded volumes at the Nordic power exchange during recent 
years and that this is often said to be good for the customers. Yet, according to the results in this 
study, a rapid increase in traded volumes does not necessarily benefit the costumers in terms of 
lower electricity prices. Rather the opposite. In order to achieve lower electricity prices at the 
Nordic market, the results of this study instead points towards the importance of interconnectivity 
and transmission infrastructure. However, bear in mind that any generalization of the results 
should be done with caution since the alternative model provided slightly modified relationships. 
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Besides general findings about multinational market integration and its effect on price, the 
regression analysis also provided useful insights about the side effects of market integration and 
its relation to price. Looking at market concentration for example, the results indicated on the one 
hand that market integration helps to improve the conditions for the market to function effectively. 
There has been a steady increase of participants on the market, which proved to have a negative 
effect on price. Yet the number of participants is not a sufficient measurement of market 
concentration and no effect could be seen with regards to the other market structure variable 
measuring market shares. The widespread belief among regulators and policy analysts that 
deregulation and electricity market integration will yield competitive markets and lower electricity 
prices thus only seems to get limited support in this study.  
 
Another integration effect that proved to have significant impact on price levels at the Nordic 
power exchange was changes in generation structure. The estimated results indicated that as the 
generation structure change at the Nordic electricity market and the generation portfolio of the 
region become more diversified, prices decrease. As was pointed out in the result section, this 
could potentially be a sign of less expensive power sources being the marginal source of 
electricity. Besides being an effect of integration, this could also be a result of a climate change 
policy leading towards more renewable capacity on the electricity market. Wind, solar and 
hydropower plants have no fuel or emission costs and if fossil fuelled plants are increasingly 
replaced by renewable sources the spot price is likely to decrease. 
 
In summary, and as an answer to the research question of this study, I find that market integration 
does have a significant effect on electricity prices at the Nordic power exchange, although the 
policy measures undertaken by the Nordic countries to create a multinational power exchange 
have only been partially successful in lowering the price of electricity.  
8.2 Further research 
The research presented in this thesis gives answers to some questions regarding multinational 
electricity market integration, but in light of the rapid progress of the electricity market in both 
Scandinavia and Europe, new research question emerge and previous research questions suddenly 
become obsolete. One of the aspects that this thesis does not take into account and that would 
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have been interesting to incorporate in a future analysis is congestion in the transmission system. 
Another aspect that is not included in this thesis is the foreign electricity import. If import is high 
it is plausible that this might affect prices and the functioning of the Nordic multinational market. 
 
Potential subjects for future research also could include environmental aspects. In parallel to the 
creation of a single internal market for energy the EU is vigorously dealing with issues related to 
the Kyoto protocol and the promotion of renewable energies. These are aspects that may have 
important impact on the functioning of the wholesale markets across Europe and it would be 
interesting to analyse the impact of some of the incentive mechanisms for the promotion of 
renewable energy sources and how it affects price and competition on the Nordic power exchange. 
 
Last but not least, the analysis presented in this thesis focuses on the Nordic electricity market but 
power exchanges are rapidly emerging in other parts of Europe as well. In light of this, it would 
be interesting to extent the analysis of market integration across EU and potentially study the 
wholesale market prices and the level of price convergence across Europe. 
8.3 Importance of findings – future energy policy 
From the general findings of this thesis there are some overall policy conclusions to be made. 
First, the effect of market integration on price points towards the importance of transmission 
infrastructure and the need for investments in cross-border capacities. If the available transmission 
capacity is not sufficient, flow of electricity is hindered and thus also competition and efficiency 
at the multinational market. Hence more investments in cross-border capacities are needed as it 
allows for a sustained effect of market integration. It is the distribution capacity that sets the upper 
limit for the trading levels and the exchange of electricity across borders hence it is distribution 
capacity that might hamper future market integration. Second, the change in generation structure 
following the market integration has been beneficial for wholesale prices. As such, companies 
should be incentivized to invest in more generation capacities to increase the diversity of the 
energy generation portfolio of the region. This may not only limit the price effects of a potential 
supply shock but also contribute to the lowering of electricity prices in general.  
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Extrapolating the results of this study towards the EU’s ambiguous goal to create a single market 
for energy a few general lessons can be highlighted. The first lesson is that insufficient 
transmission capacity might restrain the benefits of integration and reduce the relevant market. 
The building of new transmission capacities takes time but will have to be prioritized, otherwise 
markets will become smaller instead of bigger – a development that is in sharp contrast to the 
intentions of the single market for electricity. The second lesson that can be learned from the 
Nordic experience and the results of this study is that trading with electricity is not the same as 
trading with other goods. This study has underlined a number of aggravating circumstances that 
make electricity a rather problematic case. For example, electricity is difficult and costly to store, 
the demand is inelastic and the market is party network based and according to previous research, 
extra susceptible to strategic behaviour. These are issues that need to be taken into account when 
restructuring the electricity market and creating a singe European electricity market. The EU 
cannot rely on the assumption that electricity is like any other good. Opening up markets and 
building new interconnection capacities definitely supports the liberalisation process since it 
increases the number of participants on the market, but it is not sufficient to create a single 
competitive market. The European electricity market is approaching new challenges were more 
specific questions about market design and technical standards need to be considered. These are 
complex issues that account for political considerations, technical constrains and economic 
efficiency aspects. A potential way forward, however, could be trough the intermediate stage of 
regional markets. There are several recognisable regional markets in the EU today, although the 
Nordic market stands out as the most advanced in terms of effective multinational integration. 
Does this mean that the “Nordic model” should be adopted across all of the EU? The answer is 
not necessarily “yes”. The success of the Nordic countries could in many ways depend on area 
specific prerequisites such as ample supply of hydropower and a voluntary, informal commitment 
to public service by the power industry (Amundsen and Bergman, 2006:12). However it is without 
doubt that the national markets across Europe are progressively developing in the same manner as 
the Nordic countries, both physically and with respect to their regulatory framework, creating a 
new paradigm in the governance of electricity markets. 
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Appendix I – Additional information on variables and dataset 
Table 1. Missing data in dataset and descriptive statistics 
Variable Measured Missing data Obs Mean Min Max 
Electricity spot 
price 
Weekly  987 30.97 4.83 103.65 
Traded 
volumes 
Weekly 2013 935 3607.10 555.90 8782.50 
Cross border 
flow 
Yearly 2009, 2014 884 6730.48 4508 9034.20 
Number of 
participants 
Yearly 1998, 1999 
2001, 2007 
780 284.87 148 377 
Cum share of 
main entities 
Yearly 1996-2002 624 48.17 38.66 50.47 
Change in 
generation 
structure 
Yearly  936 
4.88 0 21 
  
Table 2. VIF values 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Number of 
participants 
11.56 0.086 
Cum share of main 
entities 
7.11 0.141 
Traded volumes 6.87 0.146 
Change in generation 
structure 
3.15 0.318 
Cross border flow 2.28 0.439 
Lag price 1.95 0.513 
Mean VF 5.49  
 
Table 3. Coding of country borders  
Border To   To 
1 Sweden Finland 
2 Sweden Denmark 
3 Sweden Norway 
4 Denmark Norway 
5 Norway Finland 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of the dependent variable (€/MWh) 
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Appendix II – Regression results of alternative model 
 
DV: ln(Electricity spot 
price, €/MWh) 
Alternative 
multivariate 
regression3 
Explanatory variables  
Lagged dependent (t-1) 0.021*** 
0.001 
ln(Traded volume,MWh) 0.186*** 
0.047 
ln(Cross border flow, 
MWh) 
0.444** 
0.175 
Number of participants 0.006*** 
0.002 
Cum share of main 
entities 
 
Change in generation 
mixture 
-0.011*** 
0.001 
Control variables  
Temperature (Celsius) 0.094** 
0.036 
Rain levels (mm) -0.001*** 
0.0002 
Oil price (t-52) -0.009*** 
0.002 
ln(BNP per capita, €) -1.274 
0.830 
Constant 5.638 
R-square (within) 0.89 
Observations (N) 570 
 
                                               
3 Excluding data on cumulative market share of main companies 
